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Pope v. Motel 6, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 31, 114 P.2d 277 (2005).1
EMPLOYMENT LAW-EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
&
TORT-INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS/DEFAMATIONN
Summary
On April 5, 1996, Motel 6 hired Juanita Pope as a housekeeper. Within several
months, Motel 6 promoted Ms. Pope to the position of head housekeeper. However,
within the first fourteen months of Ms. Pope’s employment she was written up, warned,
and suspended multiple times for tardiness and unsatisfactory job performance.
In June 1997, Victoria Inman, manager of the Motel 6 where Ms. Pope worked,
issued a verbal warning to Ms. Pope, telling her that she was to stop gossiping to other
Motel 6 employees. Inman explained to Ms. Pope that such conduct was inappropriate
for somebody in a management position, such as head of housekeeping. Allegedly, Ms.
Pope continued to say negative things about Inman, and Motel 6 in general.
Subsequently, after consulting Motel 6’s regional human resource manager, Inman
terminated Ms. Pope’s employment. In support of the decision to terminate Ms. Pope’s
employment, Inman produced written statements from three other Motel 6 employees,
alleging that Ms. Pope spoke poorly of both Inman and Motel 6.
Ms. Pope contended that following her termination, Inman falsely accused both
her and her husband, who also previously worked for Motel 6, of stealing several items
from Motel 6. In addition, Ms. Pope alleged that Inman falsely accused her and her
husband of writing threatening letters to Inman. Ms. Pope claimed that Inman made
these false allegations to the local police, as well as a Motel 6 area manager.
After Ms. Pope’s employment was terminated, she filed a discrimination charge
with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission (NERC). The charge asserted that Motel 6
terminated her employment because of previous incidents with her husband. Ms. Pope
claimed that she was fired because her husband, during his employment with Motel 6,
had complained about a sexual harassment incident at Motel 6, and because he had filed a
NERC charge, alleging retaliatory discharge, after Motel 6 terminated his employment.
After filing a NERC charge, Ms. Pope filed a complaint in district court. In the
complaint Ms. Pope alleged several causes of action. In particular, Ms. Pope brought the
following claims: (1) wrongful termination based on race or national origin, (2) failure to
promote based on race or national origin, (3) retaliatory termination, (4) defamation, and
(5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, after pretrial discovery, the
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district court granted summary judgment in favor of Motel 6, dismissing all of Ms.
Pope’s causes of action. Ms. Pope appealed the district court’s ruling.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court held that because Ms. Pope only alleged
retaliatory discharge in her NERC charge (with no allegations of discrimination), she had
not exhausted all administrative remedies before filing her discrimination claim in district
court. Furthermore, the court held that Nevada’s anti-retaliation statute did not apply to
Ms. Pope because she was not the individual who engaged in the protected activity. In
other words, because Ms. Pope alleged retaliatory discharge based solely on her
husband’s past conduct, she could not prevail on the claim. Lastly, the court held the
district court had properly granted Motel 6’s motion for summary judgment, regarding
Inman’s remarks to the police, because Ms. Pope failed to advance any evidence of
malice, a requisite element for defamation. However, the court held the district court
erroneously granted Motel 6’s motion for summary judgment regarding Inman’s
statements to the area manager. The court reasoned that because Motel 6 failed to show
that Inman’s comments to the area manager were intracorporate privileged
communications, the district court was incorrect in granting summary judgment.
Issues and Dispositions
Issues
1. When an employee files a discrimination claim in district court, before presenting
the claim to an administrative agency, has the individual failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies?
2. Does NRS 613.340(1), Nevada’s anti-retaliation statute, support a retaliation
claim when a third party, and not the complaining party, is the one who engaged
in the alleged protected activity?
3. Should statements made to the police before proceedings have commenced be
subject to an absolute privilege?
Dispositions
1. Yes. If an employee files a discrimination claim in district court, the employee
has failed to exhaust all administrative remedies if he or she has not previously
presented the claim to the administrative agency, unless the claim being filed is
reasonably related to another claim which was filed with the administrative
charge.
2. No. Due to the statute’s plain language, NRS 613.340 does not support a
retaliation claim when the claimant is not the one who engaged in the protected
activity.
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3. No. Statements made to the police before proceedings have commenced are not
subject to an absolute privilege, but, rather, are subject to a qualified privilege.
Commentary
State of the Law Before Pope
All three issues raised in Pope are issues of first impression for Nevada. First,
prior to Pope, the Nevada Supreme Court had never decided whether individuals can file
claims in district court, adding claims not presented in a previous NERC charge. Before
Pope, the court was equipped with Nevada’s anti-discrimination statutes,2 Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act,3 and Nevada and Ninth Circuit4 case law. The Nevada Revised
Statutes make it unlawful for an employer to discharge employees based on race or
national origin.5 Further, employees who allege discrimination are required to exhaust all
administrative remedies before filing a complaint in district court.6 However, the Ninth
Circuit recognized that individuals can still file new claims in district court as long as the
new claims are “reasonably related to the allegations of the administrative charge.”7
Although the court had been confronted with discrimination claims, it had never been
faced with whether those who had sought administrative remedies for some of their
allegations had “failed to exhaust” those remedies if the district court complaint
contained new claims that were unrelated to the NERC charge.
Second, the court addressed whether Nevada’s anti-retaliation statute applied to a
third party who did not actually engage in the protected activity. Nevada Revised Statues
explain that the anti-retaliations statutes exist in order to protect individuals who have
filed a complaint against their employer, and feel the employer has discharged them for
doing so.8 While the statute protects an employee who has been discharged after filing a
complaint against the employer, the court had never decided whether a third party is
protected from retaliation for another person’s conduct.
Third, the court addressed whether statements made by an employee to a police
officer and a senior employee, before the initiation of any criminal proceedings, deserved
absolute or qualified immunity regarding a defamation claim. Nevada law consisted of
the traditional elements of defamation,9 but the court had never previously decided the
issue of immunity as presented in Pope. The court had addressed this issue in K-Mart
2

NEV. REV. ST. § 613.330(1) (2003); NEV. REV. ST. § 613.420.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-16 (2000); Although Title VII is a federal statute, the court has looked to
Title VII for guidance in discrimination cases, due to the similarity between Title VII and Nevada’s antidiscrimination statutes.
4
See Shah v. Mt. Zion Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 642 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1981).
5
NEV. REV. ST. § 613.330(1); Shah, 642 F.2d at 271.
6
NEV. REV. ST. § 613.420.
7
Shah, 642 F.2d at 271.
8
See NEV. REV. ST. § 613.340(1).
9
The elements of defamation are (1) a false and defamatory statement of fact by the defendant concerning
the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third person; (3) fault, amounting to at least negligence;
and (4) actual or presumed damages. Pope, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 31, 114 P.2d 277 (2005); Simpson v. Mars,
Inc., 113 Nev. 188, 190, 929 P.2d 966, 967 (1997).
3
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Corporation v. Washington,10 but failed to ultimately determine which type of immunity
was appropriate for communications to the police before criminal proceedings were
initiated. In K-Mart, the court ended up applying a statutory qualified privilege, but
suggested that an absolute privilege might apply.11
Other Jurisdictions
Discrimination Claim
As noted earlier, Nevada courts have looked to federal courts for guidance in
discrimination cases. 12 Although the Ninth Circuit made it clear that individuals may not
file discrimination claims in district court if they are not reasonably related to the
administrative claims, other circuits have elaborated on what constitutes “reasonably
related.” In Harper v. Godfrey Co.,13 the Seventh Circuit explained that in order to be
reasonably related, the new claim must, at the least, have a factual relationship to the
administrative claim.14 The court continued to explain that this requires the new claim to
“describe the same conduct, and implicate the same individuals.”15
Third-party Retaliation Claim
Regarding the second issue of third-party retaliation, multiple federal jurisdictions
have addressed the issue of third-party protection in discrimination claims.16 Title VII
makes it against the law for any employer to discriminate against an employee “because
he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII, or
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participate din any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII.”17 Federal courts have concluded
that the plain language of Title VII precludes courts from granting relief to third parties
seeking relief based upon the protected actions of another person.18 These courts have
reasoned that because Title VII uses the terms “he,” and “such individual,” in describing
the protection, the only individual protected by the statute is the person who is actually
engaged in the protected activity.19 In Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 20 the Eighth Circuit
held that holding otherwise would go against the plain language of Title VII, and would
create problems in deciding who qualifies for protection under Title VII.21
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109 Nev. 1180, 866 P.2d 274 (1993).
Id. at 1191.
12
See note 3, supra.
13
45 F.3d 143, 148 (7th Cir. 1995).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Again, due to the similarity between Title VII and state anti-discrimination statutes, it is helpful to look
to federal courts for guidance.
17
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
18
See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568 (3rd Cir. 2002); Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d
1224 (5th Cir. 1996).
19
Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 561.
20
151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1998).
21
Id.
11
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Despite these federal appellate court holdings precluding third-party retaliation
claims, several federal district courts have held otherwise, based on the policy objectives
of Title VII.22 According to these courts, third-party claims are still actionable because
the purpose of Title VII is “to ensure unfettered access to statutory remedial
mechanisms.”23 However, this policy approach has been expressly rejected by at least
one federal appellate court.24
Defamation Claim (question of immunity)
Numerous jurisdictions have considered the issue of whether statements made to a
police office before the initiation of criminal proceedings receive an absolute or qualified
privilege. Most jurisdictions that have considered this issue have held that such
communications enjoy only a qualified privilege.25 These courts have held this way in
order to balance an individual’s right to enjoy an unblemished reputation against the
public interest of full disclosure of facts to the government.26
Although most courts considering this issue have applied a qualified immunity,
few jurisdictions have afforded an absolute privilege.27 These courts reason that
providing police with information is an initial step in judicial proceedings, and thus are a
critical part of the investigation process that deserves absolute protection.28
Effect of Pope on Current Law
The holding in Pope will result in more clarity regarding all three issues of first
impression. In addressing the three issues the court turned to statutes (both federal and
state), as well as state and federal case law. Due to the nature of the discrimination claim,
it was helpful for the court to compare Nevada law with federal law.
First, after looking at federal courts’ use and interpretation of Title VII, the court
made clear that individuals are precluded from raising new claims in district court if those
claims were not brought before an administrative agency, assuming they are not
adequately related to the claims that were brought before an administrative agency. If
individuals are aware of this holding they will be better informed, and can file all
necessary claims with the appropriate administrative agency before filing a district court
claim. If such notice is provided, this will save the individual time and money, and will
also help keep courts less cluttered.
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See, e.g. Gonzalez v. New York Dept. of Corr. Ser., 122 F. Supp. 2d 335, 346-47 (N.D.N.Y. 2000);
E.E.O.C. v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
23
Nalbandian Sales, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1210.
24
See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568 (3rd Cir. 2002).
25
Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, 67 (Fla. 1992) (collecting cases); see also Newark Trust Co. v.
Bruwer, 141 A.2d 615, 617 (Del. 1958); Indiana Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474, 479 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1985).
26
Fridovich, 598 So.2d at 68.
27
See, Starnes v. Int'l Harvester Co., 184 Ill. App. 3d 199, 539 N.E.2d 1372 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Hott v.
Yarbrough, 112 Tex. 179, 245 S.W. 676 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1922).
28
Starnes, 539 N.E.2d at 1374-75.
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Second, the court made clear that it will follow the plain language of Nevada’s
anti-discrimination statutes. By doing so, the court precludes third parties from obtaining
relief based on retaliation claims for the protected conduct of another individual.
Thirdly, the court has placed Nevada with the majority of jurisdictions, making
clear that an individual’s statements made to police, before the initiation of criminal
proceedings, will only be afforded a qualified privilege as opposed to an absolute
privilege. Although some may argue that this holding may impede police investigations,
this seems like a fair balance of reputation versus investigation.
Conclusion
Pope clearly establishes that an individual cannot file a discrimination claim in
district court if he or she did not first exhaust all administrative remedies. However, if the
individual is adding a new claim to a claim which was brought before an administrative
agency, the individual may still bring the claim if it is sufficiently related to the first
claim. In addition, Pope establishes that a third-party is precluded from recovering on a
retaliation claim for the protected acts of another individual. Lastly, the Court made clear
that an individual’s statements to police, before the initiation of criminal proceedings,
will enjoy merely a qualified privilege as opposed to an absolute privilege.
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